Carthage
North
Africa
Unit 5: Hannibal's war / Second Punic War
Click
on images or on the links below the images to enlarge them.
http://www.mmdtkw.org/CNAF0501ElephantsRhone.jpg
Hannibal, after defeating the Gauls on the east bank of the Rhone,
ferried his baggage and elephants across the river. The
elephants
panicked and ended up swimming the second half of the crossing.
http://www.mmdtkw.org/CNAf0502HannibalSeesAlps.jpg After crossing the Rhone, Hannibal continued north along the
east
bank and then turned eastward. Most recent research
(analysis of
Polybius compared to "ground truth") indicates that he went up the
Isere River valley into the Graian (Western) Alps. The image
shows the part of the Alps he entered, but later in the year than
when
Hannibal started his trek.
http://www.mmdtkw.org/CNAf0503HannibalRouteResearch1.jpg
The image shows the current available routes through the alps
(excluding some
tunnels). It was also made later in the year than Hannibal's
passage, but the snow shows the passes more clearly.
http://www.mmdtkw.org/CNAf0504AlpinePassesMap.jpg
A map shows the passes of the Graian Alps. The coastal route
would have been easiest, but that was forclosed by the
presence
of a Roman Consular army. Hannibal used Gallic guides that
didn't
serve him well. They led him astray and also, ultimately,
into an
ambush. In the event, he probably followed the Isere River
and
the Clapier up to the Clapier Pass.
http://www.mmdtkw.org/CNAf0505HannibalRouteResearch2.jpg Polybius interviewed at least one literate survivor of
Hannibal's
march through the Alps, and described the route in detail.
Modern
historians wish that he had given the names of geographic features
along the route, but there is no guarantee that we would be able
to
correlate the ancient Gallic names to modern names.
http://www.mmdtkw.org/CNAf0507AlpsFromSouth.jpg
A satellite photomontage of the Graian Alps (from the south) at
about
the time of year tha Hannibal went through the alps. It's
probable that he went through in October, but it may have been as
late
as early November -- much later in the year than he would have
wanted.
http://www.mmdtkw.org/CNAf0508AlpsFromWest.jpg
Looking west, we can see the easier route that was available but
which
Hannibal did not take either because of the ineptitude or because
of
the treachery of his Gallic guides.
http://www.mmdtkw.org/CNAf0509AmbushDefile.jpg One of the more gripping sections of the Polybius
description
of Hannibal's Alpine adventure was the ambush that Hannibal was
led
into
by the guides. Polybius describes a narrow defile with Gauls
on
both
sides shooting and flinging rocks down on the Barcid force.
Hannibal realized that the Gauls abandoned their positions and
returned
to their villages at night and was able to get some of his troops
up
the sides to commanding positions above the defile before the
Gauls
returned in the morning. The Gauls were then caught between
two
parts of Hannibal's army. Hannibal fought his way through,
but with heavy casualties. (Full English translations of the
Polybius and Livy descriptions of the ambush with links to
satelite
imagery of the site are at http://www.livius.org/ha-hd/hannibal/alps_text.html.)
http://www.mmdtkw.org/CNAf0510WrongChoice.jpg After the ambush, Hannibal either didn't have or didnt trust
his
guides. He
took a wrong turn and once again was taking a more difficult routh
than
he needed to. It was almost inevitable -- the
route
he took was easier on the upslope, and he couldn't know how steep
the
descent was on the other side of the Clapier Pass
http://www.mmdtkw.org/CNAf0511FirstViewItaly.jpg
From the top of the Clapier Pass you can look down onto
the
northern Italian plain. This, along with a narrow defile
that
matches the description by Polybius of the ambush site, is what
distinguishes this route from other routes proposed over the
years.
http://www.mmdtkw.org/CNAf0512HannibalPoints.jpg
Hannibal, according to Polybius, stopped for a day at the top of
the
pass (and Clapier is the only pass that has room to bivouac an
army)
and then showed his troops their first view of Italy.
http://www.mmdtkw.org/CNAf0513Landslide.jpg
The downward slope was slick and dangerous, and at a point just
below
the pass there had been a landslide that completely blocked the
path. Hannibal's sappers had to dig through it all to keep
the
convoy moving. One huge rock had to be heated and then
cracked by
pouring "vinegar" (cheap sour wine) over it. They cleared a
narrow path for the men and horses and then widened it for the
elephants.
http://www.mmdtkw.org/CNAf0515NewSnowOnOld.jpg
Polybius's source told him new snow was falling at and beyond the
pass
and that it fell on top of snow left over from the previous
year.
Passage of thousands of men and animals turned it to slush over
ice.
http://www.mmdtkw.org/CNAf0516SliperySlope.jpg
The downward path was much steeper than the path up to the
Clapier Pass -- in
some places the slope was 70%, i.e., there was a 7 meter drop for
every
10 meters forward. Men and horses can pass down such a slope
if
it's
dry, but snow was falling and there was old ice on the
slope.
Many
fell to their death. Elephants would find such a slope
virtually
impossible -- only seven survived the Alpine march.
http://www.mmdtkw.org/CNAf0518ItalianSideRoad.jpg
This switchback road gives you some idea of the slope on the
Italian
side of the Graian Alps. The Alps are one of the newest
mountain
ranges in the world, and therefore they are among the most rugged.
http://www.mmdtkw.org/CNAf0519TurnerHannibal.jpg
Joseph Mallord William Taylor's 1812 painting evokes the terror of
Hannibal's passage through the Alps. He entered the Alps
with an
army of 50,000 men, and fifteen days later only 20,000 were
left.
They rushed out onto the plain to search for food for themselves
and
their mounts.
So where did
Hannibal really cross the Alps? New evidence
announced in April 2016:
Scientists may be closer to revealing the route
taken by Hannibal as he crossed the Alps to attack
ancient Rome. A team says they have found a
churned up layer of soil at an Alpine pass near the
French-Italian border that dates to the time of
Hannibal's invasion. In Archaeometry
journal, they say the disturbed sediment
was rich in microbes that are common in horse manure.
Hannibal's third century BC campaign is seen as one
of the greatest military endeavours in antiquity. He
was commander-in-chief of the Carthaginian army during
its second war with Rome (218-201 BC). Carthage was
located in present-day Tunisia and was Rome's main
military rival at the time. In an audacious
manoeuvre, Hannibal led about 30,000 troops, 15,000
horses and 37 elephants across the Alps to challenge
Roman power on home soil. It was very nearly a
masterstroke: in a series of battles, the
Carthaginians brought the Roman military to its knees.
But Hannibal was ultimately defeated at the battle of
Zama in 202 BC.
Historians, statesmen and academics have long argued
about the route Hannibal took across the Alps. Firm
archaeological evidence has been difficult to
find.
But an international team has now argued that
the military commander led his troops across the
Col de Traversette mountain pass at an altitude of
3,000m. The results may not yet be a smoking
gun, but the researchers are hopeful of finding
other evidence from the deposit, such as tapeworm
eggs from horses - or even elephants. They
found a churned-up mass of sediment in a 1m-thick
mire at Col de Traversette that could be directly
dated to the time of the invasion. Dr Chris
Allen, from Queen's University Belfast, said the
layer had been produced by "the constant movement
of thousands of animals and humans". "Over
70% of the microbes in horse manure are from a
group known as the Clostridia, that are very
stable in soil - surviving for thousands of
years," he said. "We found scientifically
significant evidence of these same bugs in a
genetic microbial signature precisely dating to
the time of the Punic invasion."
This crossing point was first proposed over a
half century ago by the British biologist Sir
Gavin de Beer, but it has not been widely accepted
by the academic community.
http://www.mmdtkw.org/CNAf0520TauriniGauls.jpg
People had been going through the Alpine passes for centuries, but
nobody had tried to squeeze through with a large army. Even
after
all the losses, Hannibal came down into the Italian plain with
20,000
men, many horses and seven elephants. There he met with the
Taurini Gauls who overcame their initial misgivings and allied
themselves with Hannibal. The Taurini and other Cis-Alpine
Gauls
had been fighting Rome for years, trying to prevent Rome from
colonizing their region.
http://www.mmdtkw.org/CNAf0521ModernTaurini.jpg
There are still Taurini in and around Turin -- or at least Taurini
pretenders. The modern Taurini are often associated with
northern
seperatists.
http://www.mmdtkw.org/CNAf0522TicinusRiverContact.jpg
Publius Cornelius Scipio left his army at Massilia and rushed back
to
northern Italy top raise a new army to intercept Hannibal.
Their
first contact was in Novenber of 218 BC, just weeks after
Hannibal's
arrival, along the banks of the Ticinus River, a tributary of the
Po. Scipio had marched out with light infantry and cavalry
and
was met by a larger force of Carthaginian cavalry. The
Romans
lost badly and Scipio was wounded -- saved from death or capture,
according to legend, by his young warrior son who later was to
become
Scipio Africanus the Elder. This early small victory brought
many
formerly hesitant Gauls to Hannibal's banner.
http://www.mmdtkw.org/CNAf0523BattleTrebia.jpg
Before another month had passed, and while Scipio was still
recovering
from his wound, Hannibal lured Scipio's impetuous co-Consul,
Tiberius
Sempronius Longus, into battle. Hannibal had hidden a strong
detachment of cavalry behind a hill south of the battlefield, and
that
was decisive. Shortly after the battle, another Roman
cavalry
unit was chopped up in the area by a Carthaginian (Numidian)
cavalry
unit.
http://www.mmdtkw.org/CNAf0524TrebiaRiverMiniature.jpg
A 15th century miniature showing the first Roman defeat.
After
the Trebia River battle, there were small and cautious engagements
in
Italy. In Spain, Scipio's brother, Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio,
who
had been left in command of the army that Scipio had left at
Massilia,
defeated the 10,000 man force that Hannibal had left south of the
Pyrenees. Spain north of the Ebro river was now under
Roman
control.
http://www.mmdtkw.org/CNAf0525TrasimeneLake.jpg
The ambush and defeat of the Roman army under Gaius Flaminius on
the
northern shore of Lake Trasimene in June of 217 BC was another
serious
blow to Roman morale.
http://www.mmdtkw.org/CNAf0526BattleLakeTrasimene.jpg
Flaminius had been pursuing Hannibal around the north since the
beginning of the 217 campaign season. Hannibal let him catch
up
on the northern shore of Lake Trasimene. Flaminius was
caught
between the lake shore and Hannibal's troops hidden in the hills
north
of the lake. According to Polybius, Flaminius and many of
his men
were killed by Punic cavalry as they tried to swim to
safety.
Meanwhile, near the mouth of the Ebro River in Spain, a Roman
fleet
destroyed the Barcid Spanish fleet.
http://www.mmdtkw.org/CNAf0533Cunctator.jpg
According to all the precedents of Mediterranean war, Rome should
have
surrendered, but the Romans didn't respect those precedents.
Instead they reformed their armies, put more and more legions in
the
field, and "delayed". (Fabius "Cunctator")
http://www.mmdtkw.org/CNAf0534HanibalDelayed.jpg Hannibal tried to lure the Romans into large-scale set-piece
battles, but there wasn't another for nine years after
Cannae.
Instead, Roman legions -- up to 28 at one point -- operated
independently against Hannibal's allies, freeing his captured
cities as
fast as Hannibal could take them. Roman armies punished
Italian
cities
that allied themselves with Hannibal, and presently there were not
nearly so many defecting cities. Rome's manpower advantage
was
becoming, ever more clearly, the deciding factor. In Spain,
the
Roman armies under Scipio (who had recovered from his wound) and
Scipio's brother had Hannibal's brother Hasdrubal on the run
and
were preventing him from reinforcing Hannibal in Italy. (The
two
Scipio brothers eventually let over-confidence lead to their
defeat and
demise. It remained, several years later, to the son of
Publius
Cornelius Scipio -- the son who earlier had saved his father's
life at
the Ticinus River and who was later awarded the agnomen
"Africanus" --
to completely subdue the Iberian Peninsula and drive out the
Carthaginians.)
http://www.mmdtkw.org/CNAf0535HannibalAdPortas.jpg
Hannibal even menaced Rome in an attempt to provoke a big battle,
but
the Romans refused to take the bait. Hannibal (who never got
as
close as the image shows to the walls of Rome) backed off:
he
knew he could not besiege the city. Hannibal had no source
of
supplies other than foraging, and, if he sat in one place for too
long
-- outside the walls of Rome, for example -- his army would be
starving
before the city would.
http://www.mmdtkw.org/CNAf0536HasdrubalReinforcements.jpg
By 208 BC both of the Scipio brothers in Spain were dead, and that
young
Scipio warrior, who had legendarily saved his father at Ticinus,
had
been elected leader by the Roman army in Spain and ratified by the
Senate in Rome. He had briliant victories, but Hasdrubal
still
managed to slip out of his grasp and take another Barcid army
across
the Alps into Italy.
http://www.mmdtkw.org/CNAf0538BattleMetaurus.jpg
Hasdrubal was quickly intercepted at the Metaurus River by Marcus
Livius Salinator, but Hasdrubal had the numerical advantage.
During the night before the battle, the situation dramatically
changed
when Gaius Claudius Nero arrived with more light infantry and
cavalry
to reinforce Salinator. During the battle, Nero, who had
come up
against a natural barrier, took the bulk of his troops across
Salinator's rear and rolled up Hasdrubal's opposite flank.
Hasdrubal was killed, and his head was thrown into Hannibal's camp
to
announce the Roman victory to the Carthaginian forces.
Hannibal
then knew that there would be no reinforcements, and he lapsed
into the
same kind of guerilla rear action that his father, Hamilcar, had
run in
Sicily during the first Punic war. Young Scipio, meanwhile,
began
to aggitate for an invasion of the Carthaginian homeland in North
Africa.
http://www.mmdtkw.org/CNAf0540Africanus.jpg In 203, the reluctant Roman Senate sent Scipio to Sicily
knowing
full well that he planned to launch a North
African expedition, but they stipulated that he could only take
volunteers. They probably thought there would not be
many.
But Scipio's record as a successful general was such that
his
rolls were soon oversubscribed. The survivors of Cannae, who
had
been sent to Sicily in disgrace, were particularly anxious to
participate. Scipio's North African campaign was so
successful
that Carthage soon recalled Hannibal to face him.
http://www.mmdtkw.org/CNAf0541HannibalComesHome.jpg
After 16 years in Italy, the last 13 of which must have been very
frustrating, Hannibal had to evacuate through Calabria. The
maps
show a fairly simple route, but there were many side-trips and
backtrackings. Hannibal had not had a really decisive battle
for
13 years. Meanwhile, intrigue among Carthage's Numidian
allies
and an argument about a Carthaginian "princess", Sophonisba
(Saphanba'al = Punic, "protected by Baal") was about to bring the
bulk
of the famous Numidian
cavalry over to the Roman side. (See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Masinissa
and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sophonisba
for the story)
http://www.mmdtkw.org/CNAf0544Massinissa.jpg
Massinissa had previously been in contact with Scipio while
Syphax, his
rival for Numidian leadership, was being courted by
Carthage.
With Roman help Massinissa won a battle against Syphax and
captured his
camp, including his wife, the beautiful Carthaginian
princess,
Saphanba'al. She quickly changed sides and married
Massinissa. Scipio, fearing she would influence Massinissa
to
support Carthage, expressed his disaproval of the match.
Massinissa offered her poison, and she drank it as a sign of her
love
for Massinissa. Massinissa stayed loyal to Scipio.
(The
story, which has more than a tinge of mythology -- like Dido, a
self-sacrificing Punic princess -- is from Polybius, who got it
from
an unnamed Carthaginian
informant. All we really know is that Massinissa, who had
been
wooed by Scipio's envoys for some time, fought on the
side of the Romans at Zama. As his reward, he became the
first
king of all Numidia under Roman suzerainty.)
http://www.mmdtkw.org/CNAf0545ZamaBattleMap.jpg
At Zama, roles were reversed. Hannibal, for the first time,
had
an advantage in
infantry numbers, but they were inexperienced. Scipio had
fewer
infantry, but they were veterans of his Spanish victories and from
the
Sicilian garrison. Hannibal's great and unaccustomed deficit
was
in cavalry:
six thousand Numidian
cavalrymen under Masinissa, who might otherwise be at his side,
were
riding on the
right flank of Scipio's army and fighting against Hannibal.
Rome
had also, by this time, figured out how to neutralize Hanibal's
elephants. An animation of the battle is on the internet at http://www.sharemation.com/piermin/Romani/Zama_en.html.
http://www.mmdtkw.org/CNAF0547HannibalDefeated.jpg Hannibal survived the battle, and Scipio allowed him to be
active
in politics in Roman-occupied Carthage. But public opinion
back
in Rome objected to this leniency, and Hannibal eventually fled to
the
eastern Mediterranean where he found employ in a Syrian war
against
Rome. When the Syrians lost their war, he fled again to
Bythnia. Between Syria and Bythnia, he fought against Rome
for
another 20 years -- his last battle was a naval victory over a
Roman
fleet. When Bythnia succumbed to Roman might, the Romans
demanded
that he be sent to Rome.
http://www.mmdtkw.org/CNAf0549ScipioTriumph.jpg Scipio was awarded a formal triumph in Rome and became the
first
Roman to be awarded an agnomen, Africanus, related to a
victory.
He later got another agnomen, Numantius, for his pacification of a
revolt in Roman Spain. Eventually, he was brought low by
Roman
politics
-- Cato the Elder accused him and his family of bribery.
Scipio
won the case, but left Rome in disgust. He died at his
Campanian
estate the next year (183 BC) and had stipulated that his body
should
not be buried
in Rome.